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ABSTRACT
This  paper  assesses  the  effectiveness  of  vertical 
industrial  policies  within  the  European  Union.   
Vertical  industrial  policy  is  defined  as  government 
support  of  specific  firms  or  industries  (‘picking 
winners’ or ‘supporting losers’). It is measured as state 
aid granted by Member States to the manufacturing 
sectors,  with  the  aim  to  analyse  to  what  extent 
this  government  intervention  affects  the  growth  of 
multifactor  productivity  (MFP)  in  manufacturing. 
The  analysis  is  conducted  with  both  sectoral  and 
horizontal  aid,  since  in  many  cases  vertical  aid  is 
disguised  as  aid  pursuing  horizontal  objectives. 
Controlling  for  the  potential  endogeneity  of  state 
aid policy, the results indicate that vertical state aid 
contributes positively to MFP growth.
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1.  State aid: a key tool of industrial policy in the EU
This paper assesses the effectiveness of vertical industrial policies within the EU. For the purpose of 
this paper, industrial policy is defined as “the set of government interventions that by way of taxes 
(or subsidies) and regulations on domestic products or factors of production attempt to modify the 
allocation of domestic resources that results from the free operation of the market” (Gual 1995, p. 9). 
To narrow down what otherwise is a very broad definition, we exclude measures directed to primary 
sectors as well as those related to non-tradable industries, such as housing services or retail trade. 
Policies that affect most firms in a country to a similar extent – for example, investment tax credits or 
subsidies for the employment of a particular kind of labour – are also excluded. 
State aid is part of the toolkit available for governments to implement their preferred industrial 
policy.  This  toolkit  is  somewhat  limited  for  EU  countries  due  to  the  agreements  and  legislation 
directed towards creating a single internal market, including a common policy with respect to trade 
barriers, mutual recognition of standards, and so on. European laws defining the legality of state aid 
constitute perhaps the most important element in the agreed framework for implementing industrial 
policies within Europe. 
The main economic justification for industrial policy, including state aid, is the quest for efficiency. 
Thus, government aid aims to correct market failures, such as externalities, asymmetric information, 
market power, coordination problems, and public goods. The most common example of (positive) 
externalities  is  the  research  and  development  (R&D)  activity  of  private  companies.  Asymmetric 
information, in turn, is used as a justification for granting aid to small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs). Asymmetric information between a bank and an SME about the latter’s potential to repay a 
loan or about the riskiness of its projects may prevent even a profitable SME to access finance. 
Market  failures  such  as  these  justify  the  general  objectives  of  R&D  or  SME  support.  Additional 
arguments are needed, however, to justify government intervention in specific industries or firms. 
Optimal use of government resources suggests that intervention should focus on those industries 
where externalities are particularly important. In the case of R&D, general support to all sectors may 
be desirable at the European level, while individual Member States tend to focus their support to 
those sectors where a substantial part of the benefits from the externality are likely to remain within 
the national boundaries.
Another type of market failure that justifies sector-specific support is the presence of agglomeration 
externalities. In this case, firms devoted to similar or related activities need to cluster, i.e., to locate in 
geographic proximity in order to transmit tacit knowledge, with the transmission cost increasing with 
geographical distance. Industrial policy may foster the creation of clusters by subsidising firms that 
generate agglomeration externalities. On the other hand, governments may not have all necessary 
information to determine which industries are capable of generating agglomeration effects. The case 
for industrial policy on the grounds of agglomeration externalities remains thus uncertain.
Yet  another  possible  justification  for  sector-specific  industrial  policy  rests  on  strategic  trade 
considerations, first developed by Brander and Spencer (1983). The basic market failure justifying 
strategic  trade  policy  is  imperfect  competition  arising  from  scale  economies  in  production.  In 
oligopolistic  market  structures  firms  may  realise  some  excess  returns.  Governments  hence  have 
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an  incentive  to  support  national  champions  in  order  to  maintain  those  rents  within  national   
boundaries. A classical example in the European context is the Airbus case, documented in Neven  
and Seabright (1995). An argument along this line is used by Collie (2005) to analyse also the effects 
of state aid to R&D. 
This strategic trade policy justification may be particularly important in industries where network 
externalities are present. Those industries are prone to oligopolistic market structures once standards 
have been set. Hence, governments may want to intervene with a view to helping national firms 
during  the  early  stages  of  competition  for  the  market.  Although  standards  are  developed  on  a 
market-determined  basis  within  the  EU  –  meaning  that  national  bodies  only  specify  the  basic 
requirements related to public health and environmental and consumer protection – this justification 
is still applicable to industries with global geographic markets. Thus, industries might exist for which 
the  strategic  trade  justification  could  also  be  in  the  interest  of  the  EU  as  a  whole.  An  example 
is  the  development  of  the  GSM  standard  for  mobile  telecommunications,  which  was  promoted 
by Europe and declared the mandatory technology to be used in European mobile phones. This 
intervention may partly explain the faster development in Europe than in the United States of the 
mobile telecommunications industry. A second example is the development of Galileo, a technology 
intended to compete with the GPS and GLONASS systems, developed by the United States and 
Russia, respectively. 
Apart from economic efficiency, equity concerns may also justify the provision of industrial policy 
support to specific industries when the benefits in terms of social equity outweigh the negative 
effects  of  compromising  economic  efficiency.  Indeed,  some  forms  of  state  aid  involve  a  mix  of 
efficiency and equity justifications. This is the case for aid provided under structural adjustment 
policies targeted at declining industries. It is possible that the existence of some market failure, such 
as factor market rigidities (Neary 1982), prevents the adjustment through market forces alone in some 
sectors. Typically, industrial policies towards these industries also involve a redistribution of income.
Regional aid also presents a combination of efficiency and equity justifications. Rodrik (2004) adds 
a market failure justification to equity goals for aid targeted at depressed regions. He argues that 
there is a market failure in the process of discovering activities (not necessarily new) that can be 
profitably adapted to local conditions. The social value of experimenting with new activities is high, 
whereas private costs for entrepreneurs are significant and benefits, if they exist, would be shared 
with followers. In such cases, a partnership between the government and private firms could be 
desirable.
Overall,  the  design  of  state  aid  in  the  EU  aims  at  alleviating  market  failures  and  attaining 
distributional objectives, while support for cluster-like structures has not been explicitly regulated. 
However, industrial policy has increasingly concentrated on stimulating regional clusters (OECD 2001).  
Initiatives of cluster mapping have been launched for example in Belgium, Denmark, France, Austria, 
Finland, the United Kingdom and Norway (European Commission 2002), and some emphasis has 
recently been put on potentially positive effects of public policy in supporting clustering initiatives 
(Trends Business Research 2001). This support is mainly extended through regional or horizontal aid 
instruments – such as R&D or SME support – or aid for training.
Industrial policy in EU member states is, to a large extent, implemented within the agreed framework 
of  EU  state  aid  legislation.  The  objective  of  EU  state  aid  policy  is  to  regulate  and  monitor  that 
industrial policy by Member States does not distort internal market competition, affect trade, or risk 
provoking a subsidy war. To this end, a set of regulations describes and limits the types of state aid 
that can be used in the EU (Box 1).
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Box 1.  Regulation of state aid in the EU
Industrial  policy  of  EU  member  states  is  regulated  and  monitored  in  the  framework  of  EU  state  aid 
legislation. The basis of EU state aid policy is contained in Articles 87 to 89 of the Treaty of Amsterdam1. 
Article 87(1) stipulates a general ban on state aid that distorts competition and affects trade. Article 87(2) 
states mandatory exceptions from this general prohibition – including aid with social character granted 
to individual consumers, aid related to natural disasters, and aid granted to Eastern Germany related 
to the effects of the post-war division of Germany. Article 87(3) allows some discretionary exceptions, 
including regional aid, aid to combat serious unemployment, aid for culture and heritage conservation, 
aid  to  advance  important  projects  of  common  European  interest,  aid  to  deal  with  serious  economic 
disturbances, and aid to some specified economic activities. 
On  top  of  these  statutory  foundations,  Commission  and  Council  regulations  and  guidelines  specify 
administrative procedures for the implementation of state aid control. Traditionally, state aid monitored 
by the Commission has been classified in four broad categories: aid to horizontal objectives, regional aid, 
sectoral aid, and aid to individual firms for rescue and restructuring. Each of these is briefly described 
below.
Horizontal aid2 includes aid to horizontal objectives, such as R&D, environment and energy saving, SMEs, 
employment, training, and risk capital. Aid to horizontal objectives is mainly justified by market failures.
Regional  aid  aims  to  promote  the  development  of  disadvantaged  regions.  It  includes  aid  to  assisted 
regions on the basis of Article 87(3)a and (3)c. In addition, the EU also provides support to projects that 
are financed jointly with the Member States, e.g., involving Structural Funds.
Sectoral aid has historically included three types of sectors. First, aid to agriculture, fisheries, and transport 
has been exempted from the general rules on state aid and has to comply with sector-specific regulations 
(Article 36 for agriculture and fisheries; Articles 73, 76, and 154 for the transport sector). Second, a number 
of industries have been classified as ‘sensitive’ due to their particularly severe economic problems. These 
industries include coal and steel, synthetic fibres, and shipbuilding. Specific rules apply to aid to these 
industries. In general, the rules try to ensure long-term adjustment. Third, a number of industries are 
supported because they have been exposed to international competition only recently. These include 
financial services, air transport, maritime transport, and motor vehicles. The goal was to facilitate a one-
time adjustment to exogenous structural changes in market conditions.
Rescue and restructuring aid is aid awarded to individual firms in difficulties. A firm in difficulty is defined 
as one being unable, through its own resources and without outside intervention by the public authorities, 
to stem losses that will almost certainly condemn it to go out of business in the short or medium term. 
Rescue aid is temporary assistance. It should make it possible to keep a firm in difficulty afloat for the 
time needed to work out a restructuring or liquidation plan and/or for the length of time needed by 
the Commission or the national authorities to reach a decision on that plan. Restructuring aid, in turn, is 
based on a feasible, coherent, and far-reaching plan to restore a firm’s long-term viability. Since it may 
distort competition, restructuring aid is governed by the ‘one time, last time’ condition, i.e., it may be 
granted only once. 
The 1999 ‘Community Guidelines on State Aid for Rescuing and Restructuring Firms in Difficulty’ lay out 
the conditions and procedures for awarding aid. These guidelines expired on October 9, 2004, and were 
replaced by ‘Community Guidelines Applying Articles 87 and 88 of the Treaty to the Granting of Urgency 
and/or Restructuring Aid to Firms’. For a more detailed discussion, see Anestis et al. (2005).
In recent years, EU practice for new aid schemes has departed from the traditional classification. Horizontal 
objectives such as SME, training, and employment are handled with block exemptions. Some horizontal 
objectives  –  such  as  R&D  aid,  environmental  aid,  and  risk  capital  –  have  got  explicit  guidelines  for 
assessment.  Special  rules  for  particular  sectors  include  only  postal  services,  broadcasting,  audiovisual 
production electricity, shipbuilding, and steel.
1    In the Treaty of Maastricht and the Treaty of Rome, the paragraphs on state aid are numbered 92 – 94.
2    Aid  for  regional  development  and  rescue  and  restructuring  is  sometimes  also  classified  as  aid  for  horizontal 
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To set the stage for the core of this paper, let us sketch trends in state aid in the EU-15 member 
states (for more details see Riess and Välilä, this volume). For a start, it is important to point out 
that  the  analysis  of  state-aid  statistics  is  affected  by  the  state-aid  classification  of  the  European 
Commission. The primary reporting tool of the Commission is the State Aid Scoreboard, compiled 
by the Directorate General (DG) Competition, from which the following statistics are drawn. While 
aid schemes may have different objectives, the Commission classifies them according to the primary 
objective. Hence, all aid with a horizontal objective as the primary objective is considered horizontal 
aid  (for  various  types  of  horizontal  objectives  see  Box  1).  Regional  aid  is  usually  considered  as 
horizontal aid, whereas aid for rescue and restructuring is included as part of sectoral aid.
Bearing this classification in mind, trends in state aid extended by Member States in the period 
1995-2003 show three salient features. First, total state aid in the EU-15 fell from €76 billion in 
1995 to €53 billion in 2003. In relation to GDP, this represented a decline from 1 percent to a little 
more than one half of a percent. There are important differences between countries, however. To 
illustrate, in 2003, state aid ranged from 0.3 percent of GDP in the United Kingdom to 1.4 percent 
in Finland. 
Second,  a  decline  in  sectoral  aid  almost  fully  accounts  for  the  drop  in  total  state  aid.  More 
specifically, the aid classified as sectoral that was directed exclusively to the manufacturing sector 
decreased most (€13 billion), followed by that directed to coal (€4 billion), agriculture (€3 billion), 
and transport (€2 billion). As a share of total state aid, sectoral aid decreased from 60 percent in 
1995 to 44 percent in 2003 (or from 46 percent to 21 percent if we exclude agriculture, fisheries, 
and transport from the sectoral aid figures). Concerning the sectoral composition of state aid, the 
manufacturing sector is clearly the biggest recipient with a share of 55-60 percent. Agriculture 
is  the  second  biggest  recipient  (20-25  percent),  followed  by  coal  (10-15  percent),  services   
(3-5 percent), transport (2 percent) and fisheries (1 percent). There are significant differences in 
aid distribution across EU countries. Manufacturing is the biggest recipient in nine Member States, 
with its share ranging from 74 percent of total aid in Italy to 40 percent in Spain. In five Member 
States  (Finland,  Austria,  the  Netherlands,  Ireland,  France),  agriculture  is  the  main  recipient.  In 
Portugal, the services sector is the biggest recipient. Aid to the coal industry is almost exclusively 
extended in Spain, Germany, and France. 
Third – and following from the first two points – state aid with horizontal objectives was fairly stable, 
amounting to some €30 billion a year. However, separating out aid for regional development offers 
a different view: state aid for regional development decreased from about €18 billion in 1995 to 
less than €8 billion in 2003. Thus, state aid for horizontal objectives other than promoting regional 
development nearly doubled from €12½ billion to almost €22 billion. The most important horizontal 
objectives  include  environmental  protection  and  energy  saving  (29  percent  of  aid  awarded  to 
horizontal objectives in 2003), R&D (18 percent), and SMEs (16 percent). In eight countries (Austria, 
Belgium, Finland, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Sweden, and the United Kingdom), all or almost all 
state aid (excluding aid to agriculture, fisheries, and transport) is channelled through horizontal 
instruments. This shift towards horizontal aid is a clearly stated goal in the Lisbon Agenda, but – as 
we will argue below – it is likely that schemes classified as horizontal in fact correspond to (sectoral) 
vertical state aid.
Having thus described the substance and recent evolution of state aid in the EU, we now turn to 
an analysis of how effective vertical state aid has been. Section 2 will provide a review of earlier 
empirical studies on this topic. Section 3 will present the empirical model to be estimated here, and 
Section 4 reports the results of the analysis. Section 5 concludes.
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2.  Earlier evidence of the effectiveness of vertical state aid 
As mentioned above, vertical state aid is awarded to specific sectors or firms. It can be broken down 
into sectoral aid and aid for rescue and restructuring - a split we will follow in this section when 
reviewing earlier empirical studies on the effectiveness of vertical aid. Sectoral aid is considered 
vertical aid because it is granted to firms in a particular sector and is subject to specific regulations by 
the Commission. Aid for rescue and restructuring is usually included in the sectoral aid figures due to 
its potentially negative impact on competition.1
2.1  Studies on sectoral aid
There are two types of studies that examine the effect of sectoral aid: case studies for specific sectors 
and broader empirical analyses of support to manufacturing.
Starting with case studies, there is only a limited number of comprehensive descriptions on the 
effects of sectoral state aid. Röller and von Hirschhausen (1996) examine state aid to the shipbuilding 
and synthetic fibre industries in East Germany (the former German Democratic Republic) after the 
opening up of its markets in the early 1990s. The Danish Competition Authority (2002), in turn, 
analyses an aid scheme to the shipbuilding industry.
A  major  restructuring  backed  by  state  aid  measures  was  undertaken  to  turn  around  the 
economically  unviable  East  German  shipyards  after  German  reunification.  Röller  and  von 
Hirschhausen  (1996)  conclude  that  there  was  no  static  economic  rationale  justifying  the  large 
investment in East German shipyards. The market structure was highly competitive and no static 
gain  was  to  be  expected  from  an  increase  in  competition  due  to  existing  overcapacity  in  the 
industry in Europe. Moreover, the amount of state aid was very high. The shipbuilding industry most 
hurt by this additional capacity seems to have been the West German shipyards, whose market 
share fell from over 30 percent to 21 percent, whereas the distribution of market shares among the 
other large European shipbuilding countries, i.e., Denmark, Spain, and Italy, was not significantly 
altered. Taking a dynamic perspective, the authors argue that aid to East German shipyards might 
have some economic rationale since they are likely to be among the most productive shipyards in 
Europe. This, however, implies rent shifting between countries, which would be inefficient from a 
broader European perspective.
As regards state aid to the synthetic fibre industry, Röller and von Hirschhausen conclude that there 
was no static economic justification for state aid. The industry was highly competitive both on the 
supply and on the demand side. As in the shipyard case, overcapacity existed, so state aid did not 
increase competition. Again, the competitors suffering most from this aid seem to have been those 
in West Germany, since they experienced a significant loss of market share, while the three largest 
European synthetic fibre producers either increased their market share (Spain, Benelux) or kept it 
constant (Italy). From a dynamic perspective, there might again have been some rent shifting, but 
there was no evidence of an immediate adverse effect on European industry. 
1    European Commission (2005, p. 20): “In contrast, aid to support specific sectors is likely to distort competition more than 
aid for horizontal objectives and also tends to favour other objectives than identified market failures. Moreover, a significant 
part of such aid is granted to rescue or restructure companies in difficulty, one of the most potentially distortive types of 
State aid.”
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The Danish Competition Authority (2002) analyses the performance of the shipbuilding industry 
in Denmark, which received practically all Danish sectoral state aid during the past decade (1995-
2005). The study concludes that turnover, employment, and the number of shipyards have all been 
declining over the past decades, while public subsidies have been increasing, reaching 70 percent 
of wages in 2001. There is some evidence of rent-seeking activities by the subsidies’ recipients, as 
productivity in Danish shipyards has increased less than in other manufacturing industries and as 
wages for workers at shipyards have been 8-20 percent higher than for other workers in the metal 
and iron industry in same regions. However, profits have been low, indicating that state aid has not 
been channelled into excessive (accounting) profits. 
Turning then from case studies to broader empirical analyses of aid to the manufacturing sector, 
very little work has been done so far to measure its impact within the EU2: Bergström (1998) and the 
Danish Competition Authority (2001) analyse the effects of public capital subsidies on total factor 
productivity and growth. They use firm-level data and compare the development of firms having 
received state aid with the development of those that have not received any type of aid.
Bergström  (1998)  analyses  72  companies  in  the  manufacturing  sector  that  received  state  aid  in 
Sweden during 1989-95 and compares them to a random sample of 832 non-aid-receiving firms. 
He analyses selective regional subsidies, i.e., subsidies specifically directed towards firms in support 
areas and for which firms have to apply. These subsidies include localisation subsidies and loans, 
development support, support to sparsely populated areas, and loans to investment firms. Such 
subsidies must be used primarily for investments in machinery and buildings. He finds that in the 
short run, the productivity of subsidised firms increased more than the productivity of non-subsidised 
firms, but that already after three years productivity was lower in subsidised than in non-subsidised 
firms. Bergström (1998) concludes that subsidisation might give rise to allocative inefficiencies and/
or technical (X) inefficiencies due to slack or rent-seeking activities.
The Danish Competition Authority (2001) conducted a similar study on companies receiving some 
form  of  aid  during  1994–97.  The  subsidy  objectives  mainly  included  horizontal  objectives,  such 
as R&D, quality development, export and international cooperation, entrepreneurs, environment, 
energy,  and  regional  business  development.  The  study  analysed  1,491  aid-receiving  companies 
from industries belonging to five different sectors (manufacturing, business activities, trade/hotels/
restaurants,  transport,  and  construction)  and  compared  them  to  22,112  non-aid-receiving  firms. 
Using the pooled sample, no significant influence of firm-specific subsidies on productivity growth 
was  found.  The  authors  analysed  also  the  aggregated  value  at  industry  level  of  all  firm-specific 
subsidies. Results showed a negative correlation between overall subsidy intensity at the industry 
level  and  firms’  productivity  growth.  The  direction  of  causality  in  this  relationship  is,  however, 
unclear: it might be that subsidies are given to firms with lower productivity growth ex ante, or that 
high subsidies actually cause low productivity growth. When the analysis is conducted separately 
for industries belonging to each of the five sectors, they find that for the manufacturing sector this 
correlation turns out to be significantly positive: industries with higher productivity growth show 
higher subsidy intensity. 
2    Lee (1996) finds in a study for South Korea that government industrial policies primarily targeted low-productivity industries 
during 1963-83. He finds that subsidies through tax incentives and subsidised credits have not been successful in promoting 
productivity growth. Beason and Weinstein (1996) find in a study on Japanese industrial policy that a disproportionate 
amount of state aid was extended to sectors with decreasing returns to scale and low growth. They also report no evidence 
of productivity enhancement through industrial policies.
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2.2  Studies on rescue and restructuring aid
During 1995-2003, there were 94 rescue and restructuring cases notified to the European Commission.  
To our knowledge, London Economics (2004) is the only comprehensive study investigating state 
aid for rescue and restructuring. It was prepared for the European Commission and examined all 
companies  that  received  state  aid  for  rescue  and  restructuring  during  this  period,  with  the  aid 
process having ended by 2004 (i.e., by 2004, the rescue aid had been repaid or restructuring plans 
had come to an end). London Economics considered 86 cases3, of which 52 (or 60 percent) were 
restructuring cases. About 60 percent of the cases were in three Member States: Germany (26 cases), 
Italy  (16),  and  France  (12).  Sectors  most  affected  by  state  aid  for  restructuring  and  rescue  were 
construction/engineering (10 cases), the financial sector (9), and machinery (8).
London Economics define an aid-receiving company as having failed if it became bankrupt or was 
liquidated, the latter result including the sale of parts of its (core) business. Cases where the aid has 
not been repaid or where the restructuring plans have not been finished (15 cases) are excluded from 
the analysis, as such cases are not considered closed and thus the aid impact cannot be assessed. 
Among the 71 companies examined, 29 were rescue aid cases and 42 restructuring aid cases. Out of 
the 29 rescue aid cases, 14 survived, 14 went bankrupt, and for one the status is still undetermined 
since the firm is insolvent4. Out of the 42 restructuring cases, 33 survived, eight went bankrupt, and 
for one the outcome is still undetermined. 
The study seeks to determine which factors affect the survival of aid-receiving firms. It found that 
firms receiving restructuring aid have a higher probability to survive than firms receiving rescue 
aid. Moreover, if a firm’s difficulties are due to market decline or poor management, its chances of 
survival after receiving restructuring or rescue aid are higher by as much as 30 percent. On the other 
hand, firm characteristics such as size, age, legal status, sector growth, its condition at the time of aid 
(measured in profits per employee), or even the relative size of aid have no significant effect on the 
probability of survival. Neither has the design of the rescue or restructuring plan, measured as the 
duration of restructuring, capacity reductions, personnel reductions, focus on core business activities, 
cost-cutting, financial consolidation, selling or closure of plants and assets, new investment, training 
and upgrading, or plant relocation.
London Economics (2004) further analyse the post-aid performance of the firms having received aid 
in the period 1995-99. They analyse relative growth in employment, turnover, profitability, and labour 
productivity from the year of award of the aid until 2002. They compare aid-receiving firms with a set 
of firms comparable in terms of geography, activities, and size, with the industry average defined as 
the average growth of the relevant variables calculated for this set of comparable firms. The results 
suggest that out of the 22 aid-receiving companies analysed, about half increased employment 
faster than the industry average. Out of 21 companies analysed, nine (or 43 percent) grew faster in 
terms of turnover than comparable competitors, with only one company reaching levels of turnover 
above industry average. In terms of profitability, out of the 18 companies analysed, 13 (or 72 percent) 
improved their position relative to the industry average, with four reaching above average profitability 
and the remaining 14 staying well below this average. Finally, in terms of labour productivity, out of the   
3    Five cases were excluded due to their location (East Germany); one case was ignored as the aid decision had been pending; 
one case was considered a R&D case; and two cases collapsed into one as they shared the same state aid package.
4    Insolvency differs from bankruptcy in that the former is a transition state: the firm can either recover and survive or end up 
in bankruptcy.
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21 firms analysed, 16 (or 76 percent) increased labour productivity faster than industry average, with 
four companies improving the productivity from below to above the industry average.
Summarising the empirical evidence on rescue and restructuring aid, two main results seem to stand 
out. First, design rules of restructuring and rescue aid plans (including the relative amount of aid) do 
not seem to affect the probability of survival. On the contrary, this probability increases when the 
difficulties of the firm stem from poor management or market decline. Second, in terms of overall 
growth (turnover, employment), companies receiving state aid did not significantly outperform their 
competitors after the grant. However, there are signs that firms in difficulties do partially close the 
gap regarding profitability and productivity levels after receiving state aid.
3.  Model specification
3.1  Reduced-form empirical model
Several  variables  could  be  used  as  a  measure  of  performance  to  assess  the  effects  of  state  aid. 
Productivity is arguably the most important one, given the relationship between productivity and 
economic growth.
Country differences in productivity can be explained by endogenous growth models, in which the 
mechanisms of technology diffusion play an important role. These models predict convergence of 
the technologically lagging countries towards the leading country. Studies analysing convergence of 
multifactor productivity (MFP) across countries include Bernard and Jones (1996), Griffith et al. (2001), 
Scarpetta and Tressel (2002), and Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003). The evidence reported in these 
papers suggests convergence of ‘lagging’ countries towards the leading country – with convergence 
the faster, the larger the gap to the leader.
The steady-state equilibrium predicted by endogenous growth models depends on factors such 
as  the  cost  of  innovation/imitation,  the  regulatory  environment,  and  other  institutional  factors 
considered  as  given  and  exogenous.  Empirical  applications  need  to  control  for  these  factors  in 
the estimation of productivity growth, and it seems natural to think of state aid as one of these 
factors. Griffith et al. (2001) focus on the effect of R&D investment. Scarpetta and Tressel (2002) 
concentrate on the interaction between regulation and convergence. The purpose of our paper is 
to widen this approach by introducing state aid as another explanatory factor. Our analysis focuses 
on the manufacturing sector given the measurement problems that characterise non-manufacturing 
industries. Moreover, manufacturing is a footloose industry and, thus, arguably more likely to receive 
vertical state aid.
Following the convergence literature, we introduce technology transfer as a source of productivity 
growth for countries below the technological frontier.5 The technological frontier is defined by the 
country with the highest MFP in a given year. Issues related to the measurement of MFP and the 
distance of a country to the technological frontier are discussed in Box 2.
5    For  a  detailed  derivation  see  Griffith  et  al.  (2000);  compare  also  Scarpetta  and  Tressel  (2002)  and  Kolasa  and   
Zólkiewski (2004) 
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Box 2.   Measurement  of  multifactor  productivity  and  distance  to  the  technological 
frontier
To  calculate  MFP  growth  and  the  MFP  level  of  country  i  relative  to  the  frontier  country 
(i.e,  the  distance  to  the  technological  frontier),  the  superlative  index  number  approach  of   
Caves  et  al.  (1982a,  b)  is  used.  It  can  be  considered  the  discrete-time  analogue  of  the 
continuous-time formula derived by Solow to measure the rate of technological progress. The 
difference comes from the use of a translog production function instead of the more standard 
Cobb-Douglas production function. However, the assumptions of constant returns to scale and 
perfect competition in the input markets are maintained.
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where αi,t is the share of labour in value-added; Yi,t is output, Li,t is labour input, and Ki,t is 
capital input – all at time t.
Estimating the level of MFP of country i compared to the frontier country rests on a similar 
approach, essentially involving three steps. First, the level of MFP of each country is evaluated 















































, ln ) (
2
1
1 ln ) (
2
1
ln α α α α
where an upper bar above the variable denotes a geometric mean across countries. Second, 
for  each  year,  the  country  with  the  highest  MFP  relative  to  the  geometric  mean  (MMFP) 
is  defined  as  the  frontier  country,  denoted  MMFPF,t.  For  the  identification  of  the  frontier 
country, non-EU OECD countries (e.g., Canada, Japan, and the United States) are included in 
the analysis to identify the world technology leader. Third, to derive the position of country i 
relative to the frontier in year t (RMFPi,t: the superlative index number measure of relative 
MFP for country i in each year), MMFPF,t is subtracted from MMFPi,t:
RMFPi,t = MMFPi,t – MMFPF,t
One problem with this estimation of MFP and the distance to the technological frontier is 
that the share of labour in value added (αi,t) tends to be rather volatile. This might be due to 
measurement errors, short-run fluctuations in demand, and the fact that wage negotiations 
are not on an annual basis. Following Harrigan (1997) and Griffith et al. (2001), we exploit a 
property of the translog production function with constant returns to scale and the assumption 
of competitive input markets to smooth the share of labour in value added. Indeed, for this 
production function, the equalisation of the marginal product of labour to the wage produces 
a stable relationship between the share of labour in value added and the logarithm of the 
capital-labour  ratio.  Assuming  that  the  observed  share  differs  randomly  from  this  stable 
relationship, one can estimate:
( ) t i t i t i i t i L K , , , , ln ε φ υ α + + =
where εi,t is an i.i.d. error term and υi are country fixed effects. This formulation with country 
fixed effects assumes that the structure of production differs among countries only through 
differences in the first-order translog parameters (Caves 1982a, b). The fitted values of αi,t from 
this equation are used in the calculations of ΔMFPi,tand MMFPi,t.90            Volume11  N°2   2006           EIB  PAPERS
MFP  is  modelled  as  an  auto-regressive  distributed  lag  ARDL(1,1)  where  the  level  of  MFP  is 
cointegrated with the level of MFP of the technological frontier country F:
(1)    ln Ai,t = θ1 ln Ai,t-1 + θ2 ln AF,t + θ3 lnAF,t-1 + ωi,t + εi,t 
where AF is MFP in the frontier country and ω stands for all observable and non-observable factors 
influencing the level of MFP. Additionally, we assume convergence towards a steady state where 
the growth rates of MFP are equal across countries and over time and ωi,t is constant. Formally, this 
means that ΔlnAi,t = ΔlnAF,t and ΔlnAi,t = ΔlnAi,t-1. With this and (1) we can derive the steady-state 
condition: (1-θ1) = (θ2+θ3). Rearranging (1) and assuming steady-state convergence, MFP growth can 
be written as an error correction model of the form:
(2)    Δln Ai,t = θ2 Δln AF,t + (θ1-1) ln(Ai,t-1/AF,t-1) + ωi,t + εi,t 
Equation (2) describes the variation in the level of technology around its long-run trend as a function 
of a set of exogenous factors (ω), the variation in the leader’s technology around its trend (the first 
term on the right-hand side of the equation), and an error correction (the second term), which 
depends on the technology of country i compared to the leader. The first term, which captures the 
diffusion of technological advances from the leading country to the rest, is expected to be positive. 
The second term, which captures the catch up of lagging countries to the technology leader, is 
expected to be positive, too. Note, however, that catching up implies that (θ1-1) is negative because 
ln(Ai,t-1/AF,t-1) is negative, too, since Ai,t-1 < AF,t-1. The larger the parameter (θ1-1) in absolute terms, the 
stronger the catching-up effect. The MFP of countries further away from the technology frontier is 
thus expected to grow faster.
The set of ωi,t variables affects the equilibrium level of technology in country i. Therefore, a natural way to 
assess the effect of vertical state aid on productivity is to introduce it as a component in ωi,t. Its expected 
sign is ambiguous, since the efficiency-enhancing effect of vertical aid may be quite weak – agglomeration 
effects, alleviation of credit constraints, and so on – and may not compensate for the distortions it creates 
– rent capture, allocative inefficiencies, and so on. Moreover, vertical aid may adversely affect productivity 
through its impact on competition. That said, the relationship between competition and innovation and, 
thus, productivity is not clear either, as argued by Aghion and Griffith (2005).
Let us now turn to other variables included in ωi,t. They are discussed conceptually below; the data 
used in the estimations are explained in Annex 1.
As  stressed  by  the  endogenous  growth  literature,  the  accumulation  of  R&D  knowledge  is  an 
important  source  of  output  growth.  Our  measure  of  MFP  growth  accounts  for  what  cannot  be 
explained by the accumulation of physical capital and labour. In this respect, the growth of the R&D 
knowledge stock is part of MFP growth. Following Griffith et al. (2001) and Scarpetta and Tressel 
(2002), we include R&D intensity as an explanatory variable. Assuming a small rate of depreciation 
of this knowledge stock, its growth is mostly determined by R&D investment. This allows using R&D 
investment to capture the growth of R&D intensity. To avoid endogeneity problems of current R&D 
investment, we use lagged R&D investment as an explanatory variable. Similarly, public capital has 
been shown to exert some influence on growth (see Romp and de Haan 2005), so we include it as 
another explanatory variable. Since physical capital measures only include private capital, the effect 
of productive public capital is included in our MFP measure. Hence, we include the growth of public 
capital as an additional variable. 
Scarpetta and Tressel (2002) find that product market regulation (PMR) and employment protection 
legislation (EPL) have a significant (negative) impact on MFP growth rates. We therefore introduce 
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PMR and EPL indicators for the different countries. Specifically, we use an indicator of administrative 
barriers (ADMIN) to proxy for PMR in the manufacturing sector (see Annex).  
Other  factors,  such  as  the  quality  of  human  capital  and  industry  structure  are  believed  to  be 
reasonably stable over the estimation period within individual countries and will hence be captured 
via the introduction of country dummies.
Due to the relatively small data set, we do not introduce time dummies. The results of Smolny (2002) 
suggest that a large part of the annual fixed effects can be captured by introducing a dummy for the 
business cycle.6 We use the EU-15 output gap as a proxy for the business cycle to capture these effects.
Consequently, the final model specification reads as follows:
(3)      Δln Ai,t =   β1 Δln AF,t + β 2  ln(Ai,t-1/AF,t-1) + β3 (AIDi,t-1/VAi,t-1) +
     +β4 (Ri,t-1/VAi,t-1) + β5 ADMINi + β6 EPLi,t + β7 (Yt - Yt*)/Yt* + δi + εi,t
Similar to equation (2), in equation (3), we would expect β1 > 0 and β 2 < 0, with β1ΔlnAF,t and  
β2ln(Ai,t-1/AF,t-1) capturing technology diffusion and catch-up, respectively. AID denotes state aid as a 
share of manufacturing value added (VA); R denotes R&D intensity, ADMIN is a time-stable indicator 
to proxy for product market regulation, EPL a time-varying indicator for employment protection 
legislation, and (Y-Y*)/Y* denotes the EU-15 output gap; δ is a country fixed effect; and ε an i.i.d. 
shock.
3.2  Measurement of vertical aid 
In the manufacturing sector, four sub-sectors are eligible for so-called sectoral aid under specific aid 
schemes: steel, shipbuilding, synthetic fibres, and motor vehicles. Additionally, aid for rescue and 
restructuring is considered vertical state aid to the manufacturing sector.
Overall, total state aid to manufacturing (including that with horizontal objectives) dropped from 
€44  billion  in  1995  to  €29  billion  in  2003.  This  decrease  was  almost  exclusively  due  to  a  drop   
(of  €13  billion)  in  vertical  aid  directed  to  the  manufacturing  sector,  which  amounted  to  only   
€1.3 billion in 2003. As a result, the share of state aid with horizontal objectives in aggregate aid to 
manufacturing increased from 68 percent in 1995 to 94 percent in 2003. Only two states channel 
a significant amount of their state aid to the manufacturing sector through vertical instruments: 
Ireland (68 percent) and Portugal (91 percent).
However, a closer look at so-called ‘state aid with horizontal objectives’ for the manufacturing sector 
reveals some interesting details. First, about 96 percent of total state aid for horizontal objectives 
is awarded to the manufacturing sector (average 1995-2003)7. The share of manufacturing in total 
horizontal aid ranges from around 80 percent in Sweden and Portugal to almost 100 percent in the 
United Kingdom, Finland, and Greece.
6    In a cross-sectoral study on sources of productivity growth in Germany by Smolny (2000), the introduction of time dummies 
did not affect R2. But it reduced the influence of a proxy for business cycle by half and rendered it insignificant, indicating 
that a large part of the fixed time factor is captured by a business cycle proxy.
    This figure decreased from 9 percent in 1995 to 94 percent in 2003. But in interpreting this figure one should bear in mind 
that the apparently high share of manufacturing ‘state aid with horizontal objectives’ might also be due to measurement 
difficulties  when  attributing  state  aid  volumes  to  different  sectors.  Concerning  the  sectoral  distribution,  European 
Commission (2005, p.15) states: “The data currently available do not provide an accurate picture of the final recipients of the 
aid. Nevertheless, they do give some indication as to which sectors are favoured by each Member State.”
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Second,  as  mentioned  in  Section  1,  state  aid  is  always  classified  by  the  European  Commission  as 
horizontal when its primary objective is horizontal. However, there are numerous cases of state aid where 
the primary objective is horizontal, but the aid is limited to a certain industry, sub-sector, or sector.8   
In these cases there appears to be a mixture of horizontal objectives with vertical orientation of the aid. 
The data published in the State Aid Scoreboard does not allow distinguishing between horizontal aid 
designed for all sectors and horizontal aid awarded only to specific industries, sub-sectors, or sectors.
An indicator of the extent to which Members States are able to provide vertical state aid in the form 
of horizontal aid can be obtained from the pattern of, for example, Spanish aid notifications between 
1993 and 2005. During this period, Spain submitted around 305 notifications of state aid, the major 
part of which were notified as aid to investment, to SMEs, to training, or as regional aid. Aid to 
investment constituted the main objective in 21 cases, 9 of which were explicitly targeted towards 
specific sectors. Of the 44 notifications of state aid with regional support as primary objective, 22 
were targeted at specific sectors, sub-sectors or firms. And then, of the 60 cases notified as SME 
support as primary objective, 22 were sector-, sub-sector-, or firm-specific. 
We conclude that state aid labelled as ‘horizontal’ at the aggregate level for the manufacturing sector 
can, in fact, be horizontal or vertical state aid. Considering only aid labelled as sectoral (i.e., aid for 
steel, shipbuilding, synthetic fibres and motor vehicles as well as rescue and restructuring aid) surely 
underestimates the actual amount of vertical aid. That said, considering all aid to the manufacturing 
sector as vertical most likely overestimates the actual amount of vertical state aid. In the empirical 
analysis we will therefore analyse the effects of aid labelled as sectoral and of total state aid to the 
manufacturing sector.
As about 20 percent of total state aid is in favour of R&D and because such aid affects R&D intensity 
– another explanatory variable in model (3) – in an unknown way, the inclusion of both total state 
aid and R&D intensity as explanatory variables would bias the estimation results. A possible solution 
to this problem is to replace R&D intensity with a function of its determinants, which would include 
aid for R&D in the manufacturing sector as an unobservable, and to use total aid as the measure 
for vertical state aid. In this case, the effect of the unobserved R&D aid would be captured by the 
coefficient of total aid. Due to data constraints, however, we have chosen to include both variables 
and perform robustness checks by replacing business R&D with a measure of the business R&D 
component financed by industry alone.
3.3  Endogeneity of state aid 
There is a possibility that vertical aid is more likely to go to industries or firms with a particular level 
of productivity than to other industries or firms. For instance, if the policy objective is to pick winners, 
vertical aid might overwhelmingly go to high-productivity industries or firms. By contrast, if the 
objective is to support losers (with a view to helping them to adjust to a changing environment, 
for instance), aid might largely go to low-productivity industries or firms. In this sense, one cannot 
say that state aid is exogenous with respect to productivity growth. We thus have to distinguish the 
effect of state aid on productivity growth from the correlation between these two variables, which 
follows from the objective of awarding aid in the first place. Hence, instrumental variables are used 
8    To give a few examples: state aid case NN15/2000 – UK, Civil Aircraft Research and Technology Demonstration Programme 
is considered a horizontal R&D measure although directed exclusively at the civil aviation industry; state aid case N443/1999 
– Germany, R&D Aid to Institut für Solare Technologien, GmbH is classified as R&D aid and is exclusively awarded to support 
research of photovoltaics technology; state aid case N4/2005 – Sweden, Environmental Aid to Volvo Truck Corporation 
is classified as environmental aid and is exclusively awarded to foster environmental measures in the motor vehicles 
industry; state aid case XS118/2003 – Germany, Polenbürgschaft is classified as an SME block exemption case; however, it is 
exclusively awarded to the industrial machinery sector in Brandenburg, Eastern Germany.
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to estimate the effect of state aid on productivity growth, controlling for the fact that productivity 
growth may itself determine the amount of aid.
We  have  used  two  types  of  instruments.  First,  political-economy  variables  have  been  used,  as 
political characteristics of a country are likely to determine the willingness to extend aid to particular 
sectors – either because some political parties care more about equity/efficiency than others or 
because certain governmental structures are more prone to capture by interest groups. Second, 
state aid to other sectors have been used, as the willingness to grant aid can also be inferred from 
the observation of the level of aid granted to other sectors of the economy. These aids are correlated 
with aid to manufacturing and awarded independently of the productivity of the manufacturing 
sector. They are thus good potential instruments.
4.  Estimation results
4.1  Some descriptive statistics
The  computation  of  MFP  levels  and  growth  rates  according  to  the  methodology  described  in   
Box 1 yields the results summarised in Table 1. We also present the sample means of the state aid 
variables.
As Table 1 illustrates, among EU-15 countries, France is closest to the technological frontier in the 
manufacturing sector, which is determined by Canada and the United States during the sample 
period. The group of countries farthest away from the frontier include Italy, Denmark, and Spain. 
Nordic countries experienced the highest MFP growth rates, whereas Spain and the United Kingdom 
show average MFP growth close to zero.
Table 1.     Descriptive statistics on MFP, MFP growth, and state aid
MFP growth (%)
Distance to frontier
(% of technology level  
of leading country )
Vertical state aid to  
manufacturing  
(% of value added)
Total state aid to  
manufacturing  
(% of value added)
Mean St. Deviation Mean St. Deviation Mean St. Deviation Mean St. Deviation
Austria 1.73 0.0244 75.1 0.0142 0.10 0.0015 1.37 0.0019
Belgium 1.60 0.0231 82.3 0.0214 0.28 0.0043 2.23 0.0054
Denmark 1.47 0.0430 63.8 0.0186 0.07 0.0011 4.49 0.0101
Finland 5.35 0.0325 75.7 0.0819 0.08 0.0013 1.75 0.0038
France 2.61 0.0232 90.8 0.0321 0.39 0.0026 2.10 0.0050
Germany 1.36 0.0236 77.1 0.0215 1.18 0.0115 3.65 0.0117
Greece n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.78 0.0146 7.18 0.0444
Ireland n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Italy 0.56 0.0293 67.1 0.0324 0.68 0.0071 4.58 0.0241
Luxembourg n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.00 0.0000 2.56 0.0087
Netherlands 0.45 0.0290 82.4 0.0380 0.08 0.0005 1.23 0.0017
Portugal n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.63 0.0075 1.86 0.0077
Spain 0.24 0.0135 63.5 0.0348 1.08 0.0098 2.74 0.0088
Sweden 3.49 0.0371 86.4 0.0520 0.00 0.0000 0.77 0.0059
UK 0.11 0.0210 86.9 0.0786 0.01 0.0002 0.79 0.0015
Notes:    Based on 1992-2003 data (1995-2003 for state aid data for Austria, Finland, and Sweden); Mean = period average; 
n.a. = not available due to missing data either on capital stocks or value added.
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Germany and Spain stand out as the countries granting most vertical state aid in relation to value 
added in the manufacturing sector. Given their moderate total state aid, it seems that these two 
countries award a large part of state aid to manufacturing through vertical instruments. By contrast, 
Denmark awards the majority of its state aid, which is considerable, in the form of horizontal aid. 
Finally, Sweden and the United Kingdom appear to support their manufacturing sectors least among 
the sample.
It is also helpful to examine the correlation between state aid and MFP growth rates across the 
different countries. The correlation coefficients are shown in Table 2. With regard to vertical aid, 
correlation coefficients show both positive and negative relationships. Overall, however, there seems 
to be a weak positive correlation between vertical state aid and the growth rate of MFP in the next 
period for the countries extending significant amounts of vertical aid. This positive relationship is 
a little more obvious for total state aid, though it is still negative for countries with low levels of 
total state aid. Spain stands out as the single case of high levels of total state aid associated with a 
negative correlation with MFP growth.
Table 2.  Correlation between state aid in a year and MFP growth in the following year











United Kingdom 0.0098 -0.3163
Note:  Correlation between state aid at time t-1 and MFP growth in t.
4.2  Results
Table 3 presents the results of the baseline specification of the model9. When the error correction 
model  is  estimated  without  controlling  for  any  of  the  possible  alternative  determinants  of  MFP 
9    As the estimation of an error correction model presupposes the existence of a cointegrating relationship between the 
levels of MFP in each country and the frontier country, one needs to test for cointegration. However, the test would require 
knowledge of the absolute levels of MFP, which we do not observe, since only levels relative to other countries can be 
computed. As a less formal test, we performed unit root tests on the MFP growth series and report serial correlation tests 
for the error terms of the regressions. In addition, we performed Levin-Lin and Im-Shin unit root tests for panel data on the 
MFP growth of the non-frontier countries. The presence of a unit root was rejected in both tests at the 1-percent level. For 
the frontier, we used the Dickey-Fuller test with a MacKinnon p-value of 0.03. 
Germany and Spain 
grant most vertical 
state aid in relation to 
manufacturing value 
added.
Germany and Spain 
grant most vertical 
state aid in relation to 
manufacturing value 
added.EIB  PAPERS           Volume11  N°2   2006            95
growth (column 1), the estimated coefficient (β2 in equation (3)) for the technological gap (i.e., RMFP) 
is negative as expected, but statistically not significant. On the other hand, technological diffusion, 
β1 in equation (3), from the frontier country (i.e., ∆MFPFrontier) appears to be strong and statistically 
significant.
Fixed  effects  (introduced  in  column  2),  which  control  for  any  unspecified  and  country-specific 
variables,  are  significant  for  only  some  countries,  with  the  reference  country  being  the  United 
Kingdom.
Column (3) shows the results when including the output gap (Output gap EU), R&D intensity 
(R&D/VA), and the growth of public capital (gkpub). With this specification, the coefficient of the 
technological gap becomes significant and increases (in absolute terms) to -0.175; the technological 
diffusion coefficient increases and remains significant. We can also see the direct effects of the 
control variables: R&D intensity appears to have a positive, statistically significant impact on MFP 
growth, while the impact of the output gap and of public capital is negative – although for the 
latter  control  variable,  the  estimated  coefficient  is  not  statistically  significant.  Fixed  effects  for 
Finland  and  Sweden  become  insignificant,  while  a  negative  fixed  effect  for  Denmark  appears 
significant at the 5-percent level. This may indicate that Finland and Sweden were able to maintain 
higher MFP growth rates with respect to the United Kingdom due to relatively higher levels of R&D 
intensity. 
Column  (4)  shows  estimation  results  when  we  allow  for  interaction  between  R&D  intensity  and 
the technological gap. The coefficient is negative, suggesting that the effect of R&D spending is 
the stronger the farther away a country is from the technological frontier. However, contrary to  
Griffith et al. (2001), we cannot find any evidence for this interaction term being significant. This also 
implies that in our estimates R&D does not affect the speed of convergence. 
When  compared  to  other  studies,  our  estimates  of  the  diffusion  and  convergence  parameters 
appear somewhat higher, especially the diffusion estimate. In particular, the diffusion coefficient 
as estimated by Griffith et al. (2001) is around 0.13 and that of Scarpetta and Tressel (2002) is not 
significant for manufacturing industries. This compares to our estimate of around 0.5 to 0.6, which 
hold across the specifications presented in the different tables. The estimates for the convergence 
parameter vary between -0.07 and -0.097 in Griffith et al.10 and between -0.02 and -0.05 for the 
manufacturing sectors in Scarpetta and Tressel. In our study, the estimate is about -0.175 for the 
baseline specification. Those two studies use industry-level data and estimate the same parameters 
for all industries. Our study uses aggregate manufacturing data, and this implies that the parameter 
estimate is like an unweighted average of the effects of specific industries, and may incorporate 
diffusion effects across industries. 
10    The estimate decreases to around -0.02 when interaction terms with other variables are included.
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Table 3.  Baseline specifications of the MFP growth model
Variable  (1) (2) (3) (4)
Austria                   0.0069 0.0000 0.0000
Belgium                   0.0095 0.0045 0.0045
Denmark                   -0.0012       -0.0373    **       -0.0373  **
Finland                          0.0340  *** 0.0192 0.0192
France                          0.0234  ***        0.0271    **        0.0271  **
Germany                   0.0045 -0.0144 -0.0144
Italy                   -0.0082 -0.0168 -0.0168
Netherlands                   -0.0011 0.0014 0.0014
Spain                   -0.0123 -0.0181 -0.0181
Sweden                            0.0252    ** -0.0034  -0.0033  
ΔMFP Frontier , t        0.5171  ***        0.5348  ***        0.6260  ***        0.6259 ***
RMFP i,  t-1 -0.0008 -0.0414       -0.1751  *** -0.1748
Output gap EU                                            -0.0079    **       -0.0079  **
R&D/VA i,  t-1        0.6873    ** 0.6864
R&D/VA i,  t-1 x RMFP -0.0040
gkpub  -0.3151 -0.3154
_cons  0.007 -0.0115       -0.0770  ***       -0.0769  **
Statistics 
Observations 131 131 100 (b) 100 (b)
Adjusted R2 0.239 0.363 0.455 0.448
Serial correlation  2.183 2.252 2.443
Notes:    Robust standard errors are used due to presence of heteroscedasticity. Serial correlation is Bhargava et al. modified 
DW for balanced panels (b) and Baltagi-WU LBI for unbalanced panels.   *** (**) [*] indicates that the coefficient is 
significant at the 1% (5%) [10%] confidence level.  
Next, we analyse the effect of state aid on manufacturing MFP. As discussed earlier, total state aid 
to  manufacturing  includes  aid  awarded  to  R&D  objectives  and,  thus,  estimated  coefficients  are 
likely to be biased. To mitigate the possible bias in the coefficients, we have replaced R&D intensity 
by privately funded R&D. Table 4 shows the estimation results for the effect of vertical state aid, as 
classified by the European Commission (that is, for sectoral state aid). Three different specifications 
are estimated, for which we present both weighted OLS and instrumental variables GMM estimates. 
We considered two possible sets of instruments: political economy variables and state aid intensities 
in other sectors of the economy. The political variables we considered as potentially correlated with 
state aid were the number of years in office for the political party of the head of government, the 
ideology of the party in office (left-wing, right-wing, or centre), a measure of the strength of the 
government (where weaker governments are considered to be those formed by a large number of 
parties with few seats in the parliament), the number of seats of the government in the parliament, 
a measure of the strength of the opposition (defined as in the case of the governing majority), and 
the number of seats of the opposition. With respect to aid to other sectors of the economy, we 
considered state aid awarded to coal, financial services, transport, other non-manufacturing sectors, 
and to other services.
State aid to other sectors of the economy do not seem to explain state aid to manufacturing given 
the rest of exogenous regressors; first stage regression results yield insignificant coefficients for these 
instruments. Only aid to other non-manufacturing sectors seems to be significant. Nevertheless, 
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it  loses  its  significance  once  the  other  political  economy  variables  are  added  to  the  estimation. 
Therefore, state aid to other sectors of the economy cannot provide any new relevant information 
to explain the intensity of state aid to manufacturing over and above what is provided by political 
variables.
Table 4.  The effect of vertical state aid on MFP growth
Specification (1) Specification (2) Specification (3)
Variable  WLS IV GMM WLS IV GMM  WLS IV GMM
Austria 0.0000 …                                  0.0000 …                                  0.0000 …                                 
Belgium -0.0045 -0.0067 0.0000 … 0.0263 0.0241
Denmark -0.0351 -0.0319 -0.0505    ** -0.0462    ** -0.0274 -0.0262
Finland 0.0072 0.0050 0.0019 0.0002 0.0167 0.0119
France 0.0210 0.0163 0.0192 0.0164      * 0.0539    ** 0.0497    **
Germany -0.0308      * -0.0404  ** -0.0328  ** -0.0371  *** -0.0078 -0.0106
Italy -0.0194 -0.0236 -0.0270 -0.0256 0.0000 …                                 
Netherlands -0.0018 -0.0047 -0.0320      * -0.0338    ** -0.0087 -0.0144
Spain -0.0216 -0.0316 -0.0510      * -0.0541    ** -0.014 -0.0176
Sweden -0.0125 -0.0128 -0.0468      * -0.0468      * -0.0067 -0.0124
ΔMFP Frontier,  t 0.5576  *** 0.5411  *** 0.5144  *** 0.4987  *** 0.5420  *** 0.5252  ***
RMFP i,  t-1 -0.1425    ** -0.1346    ** -0.1508    ** -0.1401  *** -0.1421    ** -0.1374    **
R&D/VA i,  t-1 0.8347    ** 0.8100  ** 0.8771  *** 0.8748  *** 0.8134  ** 0.8396  ***
gkpub  -0.4038 -0.3339 -0.3202 -0.2042 -0.3841 -0.2660
Output gap EU  -0.0053 -0.0035 -0.0001 0.0009 -0.0029 -0.0024
AIDV/VA i,  t-1 0.8280      * 1.5728    ** 0.4918 0.9051 0.8684    ** 0.8679      *
EPL t-1                                     0.0289    ** 0.0272  ***                                    
ADMIN                                     -0.0260    ** -0.0252  *** -0.0249 -0.0253
EPL  t-1 (med)                                                                         0.0318 0.0336
EPL  t-1 (high)                                                                         0.0525 0.0559
_cons  -0.0645  *** -0.0616  *** -0.0694  *** -0.0663  *** -0.0501    ** -0.0496  ***
Statistics 
Observations 88 88 88 88 88 88
Adjusted R2 0.354 0.333 0.407 0.399 0.380 0.369
Serial 
correlation 2.500 2.500 2.558 2.558 2.525 2.525
Notes:    See notes to Table 3. Note further that the instrumental variables (IV) used are: (i) the number of years the party 
of the chief executive of the government has been in office; (ii) the composition of the government; and (iii) the 
ideology of the party dominating the government.
Political variables appear then to be the most suitable instruments. Among them, those that appear 
to jointly better explain the level of state aid, while being uncorrelated with MFP growth11, are the 
following: the number of years in office for the political party of the head of government (positive 
effect), the composition of the government (weaker governments awarding higher levels of aid),  
and the ideology of the party dominating the government (centrist parties awarding less aid than 
11    Shea partial R2 of the excluded instruments ranges between 0.26 and 0.38, depending on the specification. This is a 
measure of the adequacy of the instruments to explain the endogenous variable. The absence of correlation between the 
instruments and MFP growth was assessed through over-identifying restriction tests. All specifications presented in the 
tables passed the test, meaning that the hypothesis of exogeneity of the instruments could not be rejected.98            Volume11  N°2   2006           EIB  PAPERS
the rest). These results are in line with the characteristics of governments more prone to capture. The 
longer a party is in power, the higher is the probability of links with representatives of the different 
industries. At the same time, weaker governments are formed by small pivotal parties, which can 
have some lobbying power to implement the measures that please their electorate. Finally, centrist 
parties are perhaps those whose ideology is less oriented towards particular pressure groups.
Specification (1) shows the estimates obtained for the baseline model with the controls and the 
vertical state aid variable (AIDV/VA). Results show a positive and significant effect of vertical aid on 
manufacturing productivity: an extra percentage point of vertical state aid generates approximately 
0.83 percentage points (0.0083 = 0.828 * 0.01) of MFP growth in the manufacturing sector. It also 
turns out that when political variables are included as instruments, the magnitude of the vertical-aid 
coefficient more than doubles. This result holds also for total state aids (see Annex Table A1). 
Recall that the OLS estimate of the aid coefficient is the sum of the true parameter plus a bias term, 
whose sign is given by the covariance between the lagged values of vertical aid and the error term 
in the equation describing MFP growth. Taking the coefficient of the IV estimates as a consistent 
approximation of the true coefficient, we conclude that the OLS estimate is biased downwards and, 
hence, the covariance is negative. We would like to infer from this covariance the sign of the MFP 
growth parameter in the equation determining the level of vertical aid: that is, whether aid goes to 
‘winning’ or ‘losing’ sectors. Unfortunately, this is not possible without estimating a model for state 
aid. Although the expression for the covariance depends on the particular specification of this model, 
both positive and negative values of the coefficient are compatible with a negative covariance.12   
Specification (2) adds to the model the indicator on employment protection legislation (EPL) and 
that of administrative regulation (ADMIN), which proxies product market regulations. The effect of 
vertical state aid is again estimated to be positive, but becomes insignificant even after correcting 
for endogeneity. Administrative regulations have a negative and significant effect on MFP growth. 
However,  we  also  find  a  positive  and  significant  effect  of  employment  protection,  contrary  to 
the  findings  of  Scarpetta  and  Tressel  (2002).  A  categorisation  of  the  EPL  indicator  into  three 
possible levels13, taken into account by specification (3), seems to suggest that the positive effect 
of employment protection comes from countries with higher levels of employment protection14, 
though the results are not statistically significant. Vertical state aid becomes again significant with 
this specification, although its magnitude and the bias of the OLS estimate seem to be smaller and 
almost negligible. 
We estimated yet another specification with a categorisation of vertical state aid into low, medium, 
and high. More specifically, countries with no vertical state aid were classified as having low vertical 
aid. Countries with a level of vertical aid one standard deviation above the mean were classified 
as high-vertical-aid countries. The categorisation was time varying, and we took advantage of the 
fact that there are countries in the sample with no vertical aid in some years and a positive level 
in other years. Unfortunately, the correlation of the instruments at hand with the outcome of this 
12    Consider,  for  example,  the  following  linear  specification  for  state  aid:  AIDVt =  µ AIDVt-1 + α politicalt + δ gMFPt + ut. 
The expression for the covariance between AIDVt-1 (which appears in equation (3)) and the error term εt in equation (3) then 
is: Cov(AIDVt-1, εt) = - [δ/(µ+δβ3)] Var(εt). We can see that a negative covariance is compatible with positive and negative 
values of δ depending on the magnitudes of the other parameters in the equation. However, if we assume that 0<µ<1, 
it is easily seen that the true sign of β3 is inversely related to the sign of the covariance, which means that not taking into 
account the endogeneity leads to underestimates of the true parameter.
13    Low-EPL (high-EPL) countries are those with an EPL indicator more than one standard deviation below (above) the sample 
mean; the remaining countries have been categorised as intermediate-EPL countries.
14    High  employment  protection  could  favour  MFP  growth  if  protection  fosters  workers’  investment  in  firm-specific 
knowledge and skills.
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categorisation was not significant. Hence, instrumental variable estimation was not possible for this 
specification. While we do not show even the results of the OLS estimation, suffice it to mention that 
these results pointed to a negative effect of vertical aid on MFP growth for medium levels of vertical 
aid, but a positive effect for high aid levels. Nevertheless, none of the estimates was significant and 
we cannot exclude the possibility that the bias of the OLS coefficients is underestimating a positive 
effect in both categories.
A similar exercise has been performed using total state aid to manufacturing rather than only vertical 
aid. The results are presented in detail in Annex Table A1. Suffice it to note here that they are similar 
to those for vertical state aid. However, the significance of the results is stronger – possibly because 
total state aid to manufacturing has not fallen, thus avoiding a downward trend in the data that 
hinders identification. What is more, except for specification (1), i.e., the one that does not control 
for product market regulation and employment protection legislation, the impact of total aid to 
manufacturing on MFP growth appears to be higher than the impact of vertical aid. Depending on 
the specification, an extra percentage point of total state aid intensity yields between 0.76 and 1.05 
percentage points of MFP growth. 
As a final step in the analysis, we return to the impact of vertical aid on MFP growth and consider 
specifications where the potential effect of aid depends not only on the level of aid, but also on the 
distance of any particular country from the technological frontier. Technically, this implies interacting 
the regressors RMFP and AIDV/VA. Unfortunately, the limited sample size implies that such a more 
elaborated  specification  is  harder  to  estimate  precisely.  The  results  we  obtain  (not  shown)  add 
therefore little information to our main conclusions.
To summarise the main findings discussed in this section, our results point to a positive effect of 
pure vertical state aid on productivity growth in manufacturing. This effect cannot be attributed to 
the possibility that governments might tend to extend aid to sectors with higher productivity, as 
we have accounted for any endogeneity there may be between productivity and aid. Nevertheless, 
independently of the rule followed by governments, there is some evidence that productivity has 
grown faster the more aid was extended in the previous period. It is also possible that the effect of 
state aid lasts longer than a single period. However, the short dimension of our panel prevents us 
from exploring a richer structure for the lagged effects of state aid.
The effect of vertical aid, as classified by the European Commission, provides an estimate for the 
worst-case  scenario  since  efficiency  arguments  in  favour  of  such  aid  are  weak.  This  estimate  is 
positive and significant for the majority of specifications. In turn, total state aid data provides the 
best-case scenario, given that it includes aid that can be justified on efficiency grounds. In this case, 
the results are more significant and seem to indicate that the positive effects are reinforced, possibly 
through a positive impact of state aid on R&D intensity.
With regard to the model proposed, it yields robust estimates for the diffusion of technology (0.5), 
for the speed of convergence (around -0.15), and for R&D (0.8). The estimated aid coefficient is not 
as robust, varying in magnitude and significance with different measures of employment protection 
legislation (EPL). In general, when controlling for EPL, the effect of state aids decreases (becoming 
non-significant for some specifications). Aid, EPL, and PMR all measure different aspects of state 
intervention, and a challenge for further work will be to more clearly separate out the impact of aid 
from other intervention. This would surely call for a structural analysis of the joint determination of 
the allocation rule for state aid and productivity growth.
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Our results have to be interpreted with caution, however, given the short dimension of our panel. 
Better estimates for private capital stocks should enable us to use the information on state aid for all 
EU-15 countries. This would include Ireland and Portugal, two countries where the share of vertical 
state aid in total aid is among the highest in the sample. Moreover, a longer time series would allow 
us to better capture the influence of common shocks through the use of time dummies and to define 
a better lag structure for the state aid variable.
5.  Conclusions
Sectoral aid and aid for rescue and restructuring are two examples of vertical state aid, that is, aid 
extended to specific firms or industries. Horizontal state aid, in contrast, is in principle extended in 
support of broad economic goals (such as R&D, environmental protection, energy savings, promotion 
of SMEs, and so on) independently of sector. Similarly, regional aid aims at supporting all activities 
in lagging regions. The European Commission has recognised that vertical aid is “likely to distort 
competition more than aid for horizontal objectives and also tend to favour objectives other than 
identified market failures” (European Commission 2005, p.20). As a consequence, the Commission is 
encouraging Member States to reduce this type of aid.
Existing evidence concerning the effectiveness of vertical state aid is scarce and points to vertical 
aid resulting in rent shifting in the short term. With respect to rescue and restructuring aid, the only 
study existing to our knowledge indicates that firms in difficulty seem to partly close the productivity 
gap vis-à-vis other firms. Some studies using a broader definition of aid suggest that state aid may 
raise the productivity of subsidised firms in the short-term compared to that of non-subsidised ones. 
However, in the medium- to long run, the effect becomes negative.
Using a model of productivity convergence across countries, we have assessed the effects of vertical 
state aid in the manufacturing sector. There are several variables that could be used as a measure 
of performance on which to assess the effects of state aid. However, productivity appears to be the 
most important given the ultimate relationship between productivity and economic growth. We 
focus on the manufacturing sector because of the measurement problems that characterise non-
manufacturing industries. Moreover, manufacturing is footloose in nature and thus more likely to 
receive vertical state aid.
Following our discussion about the possible use of horizontal aid to extend what is de facto vertical 
aid, we consider vertical aid as representing the worst-case scenario of the effects of state aid on 
productivity. Total state aid, on the other hand, is considered to represent the best-case scenario. 
Overall, our results point to a positive, significant effect of vertical state aid on productivity growth. 
The best-case estimates are even more significant, which seems to indicate that the positive effect is 
reinforced, possibly through a favourable impact of state aid on R&D intensity. Nevertheless, given 
the correlation with other state interventions, further research on a structural model of state aids 
seems worthwhile.
Although our results have to be interpreted with caution, they seem to contradict the view that 
the efficiency justification for sectoral and rescue aid is weak. Indeed, they support the task of the 
European Commission to focus monitoring efforts on potentially distortionary state aid.
Overall, the results point 
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Annex
Data sources
Since state aid data are available on an aggregate basis, the manufacturing sector has to be modelled 
as a whole. Panel data are used for 11 EU Member States15 for 1992-2003. The data set is unbalanced 
due to missing observations and because Austria, Finland, and Sweden entered the EU only in 1995.
Output. We use value added figures from the OECD STAN database (Vol. 2005) for the manufacturing 
sector. It is customary to use a value added concept for output in the convergence literature since 
the analysis includes industries with different levels of vertical integration (Schreyer and Pilat 2001).
Capital stock. We use fixed capital stock data from the OECD STAN database (Vol. 2005) for the 
manufacturing sector. Where data were missing, the fixed capital stock series were estimated with 
the help of gross fixed capital formation data using the perpetual inventory method.16 The impact of 
capital utilisation on the measurement of MFP convergence is an issue in the convergence literature. 
Griffith et al. (2001) adjust capital stock for utilisation by using a smoothed output series, but find no 
significant impact on their results. Hence, we use unadjusted capital stock.
Labour input. Following Griffith et al. (2001) we use the number of people employed from the OECD 
STAN database (Vol. 2005) as a base measure. We also use total hours worked from the ILO database. 
Griffith et al. (2001) and Scarpetta and Tressel (2002) test for the robustness of their findings using 
hours worked instead of the number of people employed. They also make adjustments for different 
skill levels among countries and industries. However, neither modification has a significant impact on 
their results.
Purchasing power parity. A measure of purchasing power parity (PPP) is needed to convert the 
value of production into common units while taking into account differences in the purchasing 
power of each country’s currency. To take into account that relative prices might evolve differently 
across countries, the most recent convergence literature uses industry-specific expenditure PPPs 
rather than GDP PPPs17. However, Scarpetta and Tressel (2002) run a sensitivity analysis on the use 
of GDP PPPs and find that their results are not significantly altered. Since we are only looking at the 
manufacturing sector as an aggregate and in a rather homogenous set of countries (EU-15), our 
baseline estimate uses GDP PPPs taken from the OECD. 
Labour share in value added. Data on the labour share in value added are taken from the OECD 
STAN INDICATORS database.
State aid. Data on state aid are reported as aid to the manufacturing sector in percent of value 
added. They have been taken from the online version of the State Aid Scoreboard of the European 
Commission. 
15    Ireland, Luxembourg, and Portugal were dropped from the EU-15 sample due to the short series on gross capital stock 
formation, which yielded poor estimates of their private capital stocks.
16    See Scarpetta and Tressel (2003) and OECD (1999) for a description of the perpetual inventory estimation method. For 
estimating average service lives (ASL), data in OECD (1999) were used, taken from OECD (1993). For countries where no 
ASL data were available, the average of similar neighbouring countries was considered an adequate proxy.
1    See  for  example  Griffith  et  al.  (2001),  Nicoletti  and  Scarpetta  (2003),  and  Scarpetta  and  Tressel  (2002).  Kolasa  and 
Zólkiewski (2004) use GDP PPPs when analysing the determinants of MFP for Poland and estimating convergence towards 
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R&D. Data on R&D intensity are drawn from the OECD ANBERD (Vol. 2004) database. R&D intensity 
is defined as the ratio of Business Expenditure in Research and Development (BERD) to value added. 
This database, combined with information from the Main Science and Technology Indicators (MSTI), 
also from the OECD, enables us to divide the business expenditure on R&D into privately financed 
and publicly financed.
Public capital. Data on public capital are taken from Kamps (2005). The data covers the period 
1960-2001 for 22 OECD countries.
Regulation  indicators.  Indicators  on  product  market  regulation  and  employment  protection 
legislation  are  taken  from  Boylaud  et  al.  (2000).  We  proxy  product  market  regulation  for  the 
manufacturing sector using the economy-wide aggregate indicator of administrative regulations 
(ADMIN), following the reasoning in Scarpetta and Tressel (2002)18. The indicator of administrative 
regulations measures barriers to private entrepreneurial activities, such as administrative burdens 
for entrepreneurial activity as well as regulatory and administrative opacity (e.g., complexity of rules 
and procedures for licenses and permits). The indicator was calculated for 1998 and is assumed to be 
time constant. This probably underestimates efforts for European-wide harmonisation of rules and 
regulations; however, significant differences in their implementation and administrative processes 
still persist. For employment protection legislation (EPL), indicators are available for 1990 (for the 
late 1980s) and 1998; they include both regulations for regular and temporary contracts. The EPL 
indicator used in the econometric analysis is time varying (1990 and 1998); missing data have been 
estimated with the help of the compilation of changes in legislation reported in the table ‘EPL time 
series breaking points’, OECD Employment Outlook 2004, Chapter 2, Annex.
Output gap. Data on EU-15 potential output, and the output gap as the difference between actual 
and potential output, are from the AMECO database of the European Commission.
Political  economy  variables.  We  use  the  2005  update  of  the  DPI2004  database  of  Political 
Institutions compiled for the World Bank, which provides data for a large number of countries from 
1975 to 2000. From 2000 onwards, data have been updated using the sources cited in the database 
when possible and official sources for parliamentary elections in European countries.
18    Scarpetta and Tressel (2002) choose this proxy “because it refers to norms and regulations that are applied to all industries, 
while the overall indicator also includes economic regulations some of which are more sector specific, and do not apply 
to the manufacturing industries” (footnote 13, p.15).EIB  PAPERS           Volume11  N°2   2006            103
Table A1. The effect of total state aid on MFP growth
Specification (1) Specification (2) Specification (3)
Variable  WLS IV GMM WLS IV GMM  WLS IV GMM
Austria 0.0000 …                                  0.0000 …                                  0.0000 …                               
Belgium -0.0065 -0.0116 0.0000 …                                0.0363      * 0.0403    **
Denmark -0.0519    ** -0.0599  *** -0.0620  ** -0.0636  *** -0.0413      * -0.0431    **
Finland 0.0067 0.0078 0.0015 0.0081 0.0226 0.0214
France 0.0213 0.0128 0.0214      * 0.0201    ** 0.0662  *** 0.0651  ***
Germany -0.0297      -0.0409  *** -0.0310    ** -0.0346  *** 0.0036 -0.0016
Italy -0.0351      -0.0552  *** -0.0357    ** -0.0463    ** 0.0000 …                                 
Netherlands -0.0036 -0.0036 -0.0335      * -0.0249 -0.0072 -0.0130
Spain -0.0278 -0.0311 -0.0574    ** -0.0481    ** -0.0110 -0.0071
Sweden 0.0013 0.0053 -0.0358 -0.0223 0.0116 0.0048
ΔMFP Frontier,  t 0.5623  *** 0.5032  *** 0.5298  *** 0.4831  *** 0.5498  *** 0.4913  ***
RMFP i,  t-1 -0.1592    ** -0.1124      * -0.1746  *** -0.1260    ** -0.1589    ** -0.1039      *
R&D/VA i,  t-1 0.7117    ** 0.5280 0.8140  *** 0.6299      * 0.7233    ** 0.6564    **
gkpub  -0.3631 -0.3663 -0.2746 -0.3278 -0.2973 -0.1764
Output gap EU  -0.0060 -0.0021 -0.0011 0.0015 -0.0039 -0.0004
AID/VA i,  t-1 0.3585 1.0458  *** 0.1366 0.7626    ** 0.3597 1.0071    **
EPL t-1                                     0.0290    ** 0.0233      *                                    
ADMIN                                     -0.0265    ** -0.0233    ** -0.0307 -0.0406    **
EPL  t-1 (med)                                                                         0.0337 0.0485
EPL  t-1 (high)                                                                         0.0493 0.0540
_cons  -0.0651  *** -0.0544  *** -0.0718  *** -0.0591  *** -0.0493    ** -0.0373      *
Statistics 
Observations 88 88 88 88 88 88
Adjusted R2 0.375 0.302 0.424 0.368 0.392 0.339
Serial correlation 2.476 2.476 2.558 2.558 2.475 2.475
Notes:  See notes to Table 4.104            Volume11  N°2   2006           EIB  PAPERS
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